May 4, 1919

After half a dozen interminable conferences, now with Trumbitch and Korosec for Yugoslavia and then with Chiesa and di Cellere for Italy, the Adriatic problem failed to yield to our diplomatic treatment. The Colonel grew weary of listening to complaints not all of which were well founded. And I? Certainly, I was quite fagged out by my interpreting duties. And then an idea occurred to me. As the sequel proves not a very brilliant idea, perhaps it should be regarded merely as a lazy man’s effort to escape continuing responsibility and increasing boredom. I cannot claim that my idea was even novel, because the same plan was being pursued in the Saar dispute.

The hope of a reasonable settlement under my plan was based on the conversations I had had with leading Italians and above all with prominent Croats before victory came and pretensions began to sprout. I knew that both parties to the dispute were claiming more territory than belonged to them either by historic rights or by the doctrine of self-determination. And both parties to the dispute knew that I knew this. I also knew there were areas for which probably each of the disputants would fight and that there were others which they claimed merely for trading purposes. I talked in confidence with most of the delegates, many of whom had sat with me at the Congress of Submerged Nationalities (Paris, September, 1918), and I also took counsel with Professor Salvemini, who was active for Italy’s legitimate claims, among which he did not include Fiume. Seton-Watson, pupil of Supillo and an eloquent advocate of the Slav claims that would bear scrutiny, helped me to draw up a boundary line between the two nationalities which was much nearer the truth than the frontier that was drawn in the Treaty of London.

In this way we tossed about free cities and played ducks and drakes with not a few islands, and we certainly whittled down the territory which both countries claimed and insisted, it being a vital interest, much as they preferred peace, that for this they would have to fight. I made a “graph” and a map showing what we had accomplished. There was the city of Fiume and the port of Susak and a little of the adjacent territory. All the rest was assigned. “But this area, Colonel,” I explained, “we shall call Disputanta, and we shall place it under the administration of the League of Nations for the period of fifteen years. Then we shall end up with a free and fair election, a plebiscite, Uncle Sam perhaps presiding over the ballot boxes.” The Colonel was enchanted with what he called “a magical solution of all our troubles.” He ordered a number of copies of my map made and he distributed it widely. In a few days it got into the papers, and to the anger of the Colonel it was ticketed, we shall say, as the Smith-Jones plan, names far better known than mine.

So far as I know the plan was mine, but it was so simple and indeed so obvious that it might well have occurred to other observers. Then, to tell the truth, on closer contact with the dramatis personae I was not infatuated with it nor was I confident of its success, as perhaps I had been in the first blush of authorship. I was even willing to concede it was not the most perfect instrument that ever sprang from the brain of man. I also had come to the conclusion that the only way to keep Italy out of Fiume, which by rank propaganda had been accepted by millions of her deluded people as a national symbol, was by military force, and I was convinced that none of the powers wanted to make the effort, least of all Uncle Sam.

I succeeded in letting the plan go into history as the Smith-Jones plan and very, very soon it was relegated to the dead files. Hunter Miller put the document in perfect legal shape and then both sides dropped it.

* * * * *

I find these memos in my daybook:

April 14th. The President told Orlando he would consent to giving Fiume the status of an international port with full measure of local autonomy. Orlando’s answer was a sibilant Sicilian “No.”

April 19th. The President made what he regarded as a further concession. He was willing to place the disputed port and a rim of surrounding country under League administration somewhat like the Saar, with the promise of a plebiscite at some future and more tranquil day. This seems to be a revival of my plan, endorsed by House but long since lost in the general shuffle. It has at least one virtue. Neither of the contenders would suffer immediate defeat. They could both hope for victory at the polls at some not-too-distant day and then perhaps, as Tardieu remarks (he is enthusiastic for the plan), “No one would care whether he was saddled with the miserable fishing village or not.” I do not agree because I know how important this sea front is to the Yugoslavs; but it was not necessary for me to express an opinion, for in half an hour Orlando had answered with a rotund “No” rather than his usual Papal “non possumus.”