May 10, 1919

Yesterday another problem, long regarded as of but little importance, has raised its ugly head. It concerns Silesia or Upper Silesia and what its sovereignty is to be in the New Europe. Both Clemenceau and Tardieu were in this morning and had a long talk with my Colonel at which I assisted.

“Our generals have convinced me,” said the Tiger, “that the German grab of Silesia is the first move in the rearmament of Germany, and that another invasion of France will come in five or ten years, perhaps a little sooner, perhaps a little later, but come it will. Our experts and most of the others are in agreement that the disputed territory belongs to Poland despite the fact that large colonies of Germans have been brought in and by strong-armed methods given possession of perhaps most of the small farms. Important as this is, more important still is the fact that if Berlin is given control of these ore regions the rearmament of our truculent enemy will be greatly facilitated.”

Here Tardieu interpolated with: “General Weygand says we can with but little difficulty, keep a wary eye on the Ruhr, that near-by industrial and potential rearmament center, but it is a far cry to Silesia, and out there it would not be difficult to veil preparations for a renewal of the war, and there unfortunately is to be found everything necessary to the rearmament of the Barbarians we have only brought to heel after four years of costly war.”

When they had left, Colonel House told me that in this matter Lloyd George is making difficulties. He insists upon a plebiscite, at least in Upper Silesia, where even the Poles admit that the German settlers who have been planted there are probably in a majority. House went on to say, “Lloyd George told me only three days ago that he was informed on the best authority that the Germans would not sign the Treaty unless as in other disputed provinces sovereignty had been decided by a plebiscite. If this injustice is done the Germans, we too may not see our way to accepting the Treaty or at best we may be compelled to show our dissent with a formal reservation.”

House is greatly worried over this problem and has debated it quite frequently with the “Governor,” as he calls the President. Confronted as he is with this decision, he fears that Wilson will accept the plebiscite. “He recognizes as clearly as I do that he may be making a considerable sacrifice, but he feels he must resign himself to it to save the Covenant, for of course if Britain draws back all will be lost. I hope the Governor is right in his belief that once the war psychosis is abated the Covenant will work the wonders that are beyond its powers today.” Then with a sigh he added, “Britain does not want a France too strong or a Germany too weak. That is the lesson of the balance-of-power policy; but I question the wisdom of this concession. Out of the ore fields of Silesia may be fashioned the weapons of the next world war.”