March 11, 1919

The problem of the Rhine is now the order of the day. Tardieu came in this morning and had a long talk with the Colonel who asked me to be present and, when he left, to draw up a memo of what was said. He admitted that by the Armistice arrangements the Fourteen Points had become binding on France, but he asserted they should be interpreted in the light of what he called “antecedent circumstances.” He went into what he called the historique of the Rhine problem for the purpose of showing that the present demand for a rearrangement of the frontier had always been a principal war aim of France. He brought with him documents to prove that the question had been taken up with some of the Allies in January, 1917, three months before we entered the war, and that at least with Russia an agreement had been reached. At this time Briand, who was Prime Minister, had instructed the French Ambassador in St. Petersburg to advise the Russian government that in view of the fact that her vital interests were involved France must be allowed a preponderant influence in the adjustment of the Rhine frontier. “In the future,” ran this communication, “Germany must not be allowed to touch the Rhine or to secure positions near by which would facilitate future aggression.”

Tardieu also revealed a communication which at the same time was sent by his Foreign Office to Ambassador Paul Cambon in London. In it Cambon was instructed to feel out Britain as to the best methods of securing the independence of the Rhine provinces or, in any event, of shielding them from Prussian contact and influence.

However, as the instruction revealed, leeway was granted Cambon as to when and how he should broach the subject. He was not to introduce it if in his judgment it would lead to discord between the principal allies or even to discussion. A few days later the Briand ministry fell and the instruction was not renewed.

But with Russia the negotiations went much farther. M. Doumergue was sent to St. Petersburg with a letter from the President of the Republic to his great and good friend the Tsar in which, once again it was affirmed that both Britain and France had agreed to give Constantinople to Russia and also some territory in Thrace that was to be taken away from ungrateful Bulgaria. M. Doumergue brought back from St. Petersburg his quid pro quo. The Tsar agreed to support whatever decision France might make as to the future of the Rhine.

“It was not intended to keep these arrangements secret,” explained Tardieu. “On the contrary it was planned to publish them urbe et orbe at a favorable moment, for instance, when the expected success of the Nivelle offensive was apparent. Indeed a secondary instruction went to Paul Cambon in London advising him that in the opinion of the French government this would be the appropriate moment to inform London of its views, indeed of its decision. But unfortunately Nivelle was not successful and on March 12, 1917, the Tsar was overthrown and all the papers dealing with the matter went into the waiting but certainly not into the “dead” files. So we admit that when Lloyd George came to Paris he was not bound by treaty, open or secret, to any territorial arrangements with France except in regard to Turkey in Asia and also unfortunately on the Adriatic.”

Two days later Jules Cambon came in on what the Colonel called a “follow-up” mission. He is an ardent partisan of a division of Germany into what he calls “its component parts.” “We must separate the sheep from the goats,” he said; “the good Bavarians from the stiff-necked, impossible Prussians. Otherwise there will never be peace on our frontier or for that matter in Europe.” His argument is as follows:

“It was the wicked treaty imposed by our conquerors in 1815 that put Prussia on the Rhine. Who can deny that from that sad day to 1870 the inhabitants of these stolen regions have regarded themselves as the unfortunate victims of a detestable diplomatic combination? I hope the right of self-determination will be granted to these people and that in any event the dominance of Prussia will be terminated. Among the Germans, Prussian influence will always be great, perhaps controlling, and this danger must be removed from our frontier as far as possible.

“I cannot see,” continued Cambon, “how our plan runs counter to the humanitarian ideals of your great President, and I even think it will find favor in many liberal circles in Germany and perhaps secure the support of some Prussians who must be tired of the recurrent and fruitless wars to which this unsettled frontier condemns them.”

The Colonel spends much time reading and pondering over these memoranda. Today he said, “I do not have to tell you that this is ‘graveyard stuff.’ France won the battle of the Marne and the struggle for Verdun, but now the Battle for the Rhine looms on our dark horizon. How will it end? I confess I do not know.”