January 22, 1919

Venizelos has had a series of long talks with the Colonel during the past week. He is evidently greatly perturbed over the outlook which seems to me, and evidently to him also, rather nebulous. He is convinced that Wilson will not accept for America a mandate for Constantinople and the control of the Straits that has been offered. Of course, he was never an outspoken advocate of this arrangement, although he did not openly oppose it. He was evidently convinced that, if accepted, in a short time Washington would tire of this responsibility and withdraw after things had settled down, and then Greater Greece would emerge. Now he thinks that the President has been won over to another plan, one far from favorable to Greek aspirations, and that this plan will shortly be submitted to the Supreme Council. He would like to have it reshaped (“reformed” he calls it) before it reaches this stage.

Last evening, at the suggestion of the Colonel, Frazier had Venizelos and myself to dine at his charming apartment on the Avenue du Bois. The nerves of the Greek Prime Minister are evidently worn to a frazzle, and we did not get away until long after midnight. While greatly condensed, I think these notes which I made on my return to the Crillon do justice to his plea, although they are not always given in his words.

“Flesh and blood, not even Greek flesh and blood, can stand further delay in the approach toward a settlement of our problems,” he said. “For six months now we have had two hundred and fifty thousand men mobilized and in the field at the request, I might even say at the order, of the Allies. This has cost us millions upon millions of drachmas which we haven’t got, which we have borrowed and shall have to repay. Mobilized, yes; but mobilized for what? We are not told. ‘Wait and see,’ whisper the members of the Supreme Council— but of course quite unofficially. Apparently, we are not mobilized to take over Constantinople, although that has been our dream for centuries, or even for a large slice of Thrace. Lloyd George points significantly to Smyrna and the fat lands around it where there is such a large purely Greek population. ‘There a great future awaits you,’ he insists, but within the hour he is urging Italy to jump in there on our right flank, and you can’t help concluding that he has earmarked Adalia and the rich near-by districts for the Italians.

“ ‘What are we mobilized for?’ I inquire, and he answers jovially: ‘Have a little patience. You will learn very soon. Be assured the Council is not neglecting your problems.’ I can wait, but it is quite clear that the Greek treasury can’t stand the strain, nor, as a matter of fact, can our soldiers. Last September the morale of our men was excellent. They were eager to fight and to go anywhere, but now they want to go home, to get away from the stinking camps.”

Then his great grievance came out. We could not answer it because it deals with an alleged proposal of President Wilson about which House has not been informed and of which we know nothing. Venizelos has what he regards as reliable information to the effect that as a substitute to the American mandate he, Wilson, is proposing an international state or administration for Turkey in Europe.

“This plan, if carried out,” he maintained, “would take away from us over 700,000 Greeks, that is, at least 28,000 in western Thrace, in eastern Thrace and about 360,000 in the vilayet of Constantinople. It is probably true that in this territory there are about Turks. This I admit is a problem, but the way to meet it is not by placing this great number of our people under non-Greek sovereignty right next door to Greece. The result would be constant agitation and I fear civil war.

“There are in Greece, in Thrace, and in Asia Minor about seven and a half million Greeks,” he continued, “but if this plan, which they ascribe to Wilson, is approved by the Supreme Council, at least a million of our people, whom we thought to ‘redeem,’ would have to live outside of our boundaries and under an alien administration. This should not be done. How can it be done? In its original form the proposal of an international administration to cope with the problem of Constantinople had a simple and limited objective which was to guarantee the freedom of the Straits for all time and against all comers. As at first proposed, the Enos-Media line was to be the frontier with Europe, but in its expanded form it takes away from us nearly a million of our people and the resulting international state could never prosper. Indeed, it seems to me to be designed to keep alive the racial conflicts which we had hoped with the coming of peace would subside if not wholly disappear.”

M. Politis, the Greek Minister to France and a delegate to the Conference, came to the Crillon this morning and he certainly crossed the t’s and dotted the ?s of the Venizelos talk. He read and left with House an informal memo to the following effect:

Unless the project now under discussion is rejected by the Supreme Council in a few days, the Greek government will file a formal protest. I beg to remind you that M. Venizelos brought our country into the war spontaneously without making any conditions. He simply rallied Greece to the side of justice. Since the Armistice he has listened to the counsels of the Allies and complied with all their demands—at times against his better judgment. Since Armistice Day he has mobilized three new divisions, making twelve divisions under arms. As requested, he has in this way held himself in readiness to carry out the instructions of the Conference, either in Smyrna or more recently, with due regard to the menace of Bulgaria, in Thrace. It must be clear that this proposal [the changed frontier with Turkey in Europe], ascribed unjustly we believe to President Wilson, if approved, would place Greece and the present government in a most unenviable position, although its deserts are certainly greater than those of any of the other countries of Southeastern Europe who have been so greatly favored, particularly Rumania. Unlike the situation in many of the districts granted to the Bucharest government, the lands which we should have, and are apparently in danger of losing, are occupied by Greek populations.

In conclusion Politis said: “What I am about to say is not authorized by M. Venizelos, but it is so important that I think you will pardon my indiscretion—if it is one. If this plan is approved, the first result would be the fall of the present government in Athens and the return to power of King Constantine and the pro-Germans. Even now these people are saying that we have failed to secure the benefits we fought for and were fully justified in demanding.”

[1922. On the first of September following, the Supreme Council rejected the plan, described it as one contained in Mr. Wilson’s letter for “reasons ethnographic, political, and moral,” and requested Mr. Polk to draw the President’s attention “to the desirability of seeking a solution to this question more in harmony with the general bases of the peace, one less unfavorable to Greece, and one more proper to avoid future incidents in the Balkans.” This was one of the least happy of the President’s interventions; fortunately the results were not as lasting as his abandonment of the Austrians in the South Tyrol.]

House had a long conference on the following day with the President and placed the information contained in these memoranda before him. He came back still rather uncertain that the plan which the Greeks opposed could be ascribed to Wilson. The President’s memory on the subject was apparently not quite clear.