March 11, 1919

Lloyd George came in and had a long talk with the Colonel. The purpose of his coming was to say that he was willing to state that in case of another invasion of France by Germany Britain would come to her aid. “But,” he added, “I want to say definitely and finally that we are not willing to maintain an army for an indefinite period on the Rhine.”

“In that position we are in complete agreement,” said House.

Then George began on another task.

“House, if you will allow me, I want to speak to you on a personal matter.”

“Go ahead,” said the Colonel.

“I have been lambasted by Northcliffe and his henchmen for having held what they call a ‘Khaki election’ and so securing a parliamentary endorsement in the hour of victory when the people could not deny anything to the government that had weathered the storm. They even say, these people who were not so very helpful in winning the war, that by this ‘trick’ I secured a new lease of power that in calmer moments the people would have denied me. This was not my purpose, and I want to tell you what my thought really was. I think it will merit your approval.

“I knew—how could I help knowing?—that I had the people of England and indeed of the Empire with me in support of my war policy one hundred per cent. But after November 11, the course to be pursued was not so clear. New problems were presented, and the main one was how to win the peace. I went to the people, told them what I had in mind frankly and openly, and they endorsed my policy. Northcliffe says I am a political trickster, but what would he and those who take orders from him have said if I had not gone to the polls and consulted the people? I think I did right and that I am much stronger now with my renewed mandate from the people than is Wilson with his Congress arrayed against him. Clemenceau also is stronger because he has secured several votes of confidence in the Chamber, and today only Wilson is threatened and is in danger. For this I am profoundly sorry. We in England do not wish to see him weakened; we need him almost as much as we did last spring when we were fighting with our backs to the wall and the outlook was none too encouraging.”

“The effect of the November election is greatly exaggerated and partly, at least, misunderstood over here,” protested House. “By and large, our people support the Wilson policy; there were in the election local issues and tactical mistakes which lend themselves to the misunderstanding of the result so prevalent in France and in England too. There should, of course, have been no partisan appeal in the President’s election manifest. However, the people are with him, and when the time for decision comes Congress will be with him too.”

House had made a brave showing, but after Lloyd George left he was not so cheerful:

“There is much in what George says,” he admitted ruefully. “The hot fit is over and the President is not as strong as he was. We should have secured a preliminary peace within three weeks of his arrival in Paris. It should not have taken us much longer to have laid down the public law of the new era we hope to enter upon. Now we must do what we can, and I am confident we shall succeed. Every day of delay and hesitation is against us. But while regretting these delays and hesitations, I see and frankly admit that there were difficulties and obstacles to quick action. Ours was not an easy task. Perhaps the greatest was the question, ‘Would the Republican Weimar government survive, and would it be able to suppress the Spartacist revolt in Germany?’ Undoubtedly these people were in close touch with Moscow and were receiving substantial support in money and munitions from them, and as late as January their movement seemed formidable. More than once Clemenceau said to me, ‘It is wise to wait and watch and see. What possible use would it be to make peace or any other arrangements with governments such as those of Ebert’s and Lenin’s, which may not survive; let us make haste slowly.’”