April 26, 1919

The attitude of the President in the Fiume imbroglio is being hotly discussed and has given rise to many interpretations—not all of which can be correct. Some assert that what they call his “mulish stubbornness” is due to his regret (at times they call it his “remorse”) at having conceded the Brenner and the three hundred thousand bed-rock Germans who live in the South Tyrol to the grasping Romans. As to why he made this disastrous concession, I at least am not informed. Some say he acted on a sudden impulse; others that he was beguiled to take this unfortunate step by one of his advisers on geographical matters who loves to dine at the Hotel Edouard VII, where undoubtedly the Italians set an excellent table. But whatever may be his reasons, it is evident that the President, as far as Fiume is concerned, has returned to his original principles embodied in the Fourteen Points, and which, as he at least insists, were frankly accepted by Orlando during the armistice negotiations.

Tardieu puts in appearance daily, almost hourly in fact. He begs the Colonel to persuade the President to take a realistic view of the situation, which he asserts is endangering the none-too-friendly relations between Rome and Paris. His argument is this: “The good will of Italy is more important to the peace of the world than the ultimate disposition of a miserable Dalmatian fishing village.” And he adds: “I fear that the Italians, unless they are ‘sweetened,’ will turn pro-German.”

Under instructions from the President, House has talked repeatedly with Lloyd George and with Clemenceau and also with those of their experts to whom the prime ministers are inclined to listen. All agree that their sympathies are with Wilson, but unfortunately, they are bound by a treaty which they cannot ignore. When told that Fiume is expressly excluded from the Italian domain and given to the Croats by the secret treaty, they say nevertheless that Italy must be kept happy or Orlando will not sign, and then our united front against the barbarians is broken.

In his report on the negotiations as of today, House told the President: “The situation is perfectly clear. Orlando will not give up Fiume because he is convinced that if he does his ministry will fall, and Page¹ wires from Rome that the Sicilian’s conclusion is perfectly correct. He asserts that no ministry that signed the treaty without Fiume as part of the booty would survive.” He (House) then went on to say to the President:

“In our insistence on giving Fiume to the Yugoslavs we stand alone and unsupported, except for a few expressions of platonic sympathy. What is the wisest course? We can keep Italy out by force of arms, perhaps even by merely sending a few warships to the Adriatic port; but then the united front would be broken and Germany and Russia would rejoice—and not without reason.”

The President listened with interest but said nothing. He had, it seemed to me, embarked upon his course without exploring the dangers that lurk ahead. In my judgment, the Colonel is against military measures to keep the Italians out of the disputed port. He thinks that would be an armed intervention in the affairs of Europe, which neither the Congress nor the people of the United States would approve unless they had been consulted in advance. I think, though he does not say so, that the Colonel is in favor of a policy of postponement, of procrastination; of bringing pressure to bear upon both Belgrade and Rome not to fight, and so, after a cooling-off period, to have the problem certified to the Council of the League as one threatening the peace of the world, which under the Covenant it is empowered to face and should solve.