March 29, 1919

This afternoon Faisal and Lawrence came for what is probably a farewell call, as the Emir says he expects to return to Syria in a few days. Faisal was more self-contained, certainly less obstreperous, than he was the day he stormed and thundered before the Council of Ten. He read to House the protocol of the promises the British made to his father, King Hussein, on October 24, 1915. Clearly it promised recognition of Arab independence, outside of Bagdad and Basra, if the Arabs joined up with the Allies. Then he read the Sykes-Picot agreement of May, 1916, providing for a very different and a very definite partition of the Arab lands. Of course, these contradictory promises were made under the stress of a disturbing military situation, but all the same no white man could listen to them without deep regret.

“Now it seems I shall have to return to my people empty-handed, and I am at a loss to explain why. I have come to ask you again what chance is there of America taking a mandate over our country and our people? In this way the danger of the present friction between England and France that may result in war would be avoided and my people would feel assured of ultimate independence.”

House said that he could not make any definite promises. The President was interested and would use his good offices toward a favorable solution, but the Arab lands were far from the American sphere and acceptance of responsibility in Asia would be quite a departure from American tradition. Suddenly Faisal’s face, hitherto so placid, became distorted and the long-covered fires blazed into view. “We Arabs would rather die than accept the supremacy of the French—although it be sugar-coated as a mandate subject to the control of the League.”

When Lawrence had quieted him down Faisal put another equally awkward question: “What will America do to save what is left of Armenia?”

House could only answer that the question was under advisement and study; that “if the advice and consent of the Senate could be secured, the President would accept a mandate over those unfortunate people.”

House then said the President had determined to send a commission to Syria to investigate and report back. “What do you think of it?” “I think well of it,” answered Faisal, “but the French will leave nothing undone in the way of hampering the work of the commission. The American commissioners will have to be sturdy fellows.” [A few days later, President Wilson nominated Dr. King of Oberlin College and Charles R. Crane, a well-known sympathizer in the Arab cause, as the American members of what he thought was to be an international commission. The French declined to nominate a member and the British failed to do so. In the following summer the Americans visited most of the disturbed Arab provinces and reported that a French mandate was unacceptable to the people and would result in war. Little attention was paid to the report in America and it was ignored in Europe. Recognizing that all the war promises had become dead letters, a few months later Faisal made the best bargain he could with Clemenceau. He was given Damascus and the interior of Syria, but in April, 1920, the Supreme War Council, without authority, it seemed to many, gave to France a mandate over Syria, whereupon the Clemenceau-Faisal agreement was tom up by M. Millerand. “Inshallah! I shall remain in Damascus,” declared Faisal, and it is a fact that it required the heavy artillery of Generals Gouraud and Sarrail to blow him out of the oldest living city in the world.]