March 24, 1919

Even those of us who are so fortunate as not to be directly involved (we who are only plagued by the repercussions) are well aware that the Armistice commissioners who meet at least once a month at Spa to clarify, implement, renew, and also extend the terms of that document are facing squalls. It is not too much to say that Marshal Foch himself is so disgusted, at least so say his military aides such as Generals Dupont and Mordacq, that he is seriously thinking of dropping

the historic instrument into the Seine and beginning all over again. That means, of course, stiffer terms than those laid before the Germans at Compiegne last November.

Mordacq, who is of course closer to Clemenceau than he is to the Generalissimo, says that Foch accepts some measure of responsibility for what he now admits is an almost complete fiasco. He pleads in extenuation, however, that the terms were not what he wanted or what he would have presented had he stood alone, but a compromise document which was the limit of what he could persuade his associates representing the Allied and Associated Powers to agree to. Foch says the delays which they contrive and the back-peddling in which the Germans are so proficient simply mean that they are well aware of the speed with which the English and the American forces are sailing away from France and that they are preparing to reject even anodyne terms which could only be enforced by the war-weary French army. War-weary certainly and even somewhat mutinous many of the French units are growing if we can believe the reports that are coming to us almost every day from the winter cantonments and even from the rest billets in the south of France.

As was to be expected, these long-continued discussions, not to say disputes, resulted in a crisis and it became acute the day before yesterday. Flatly the German commissioners announced that their government would not permit the Polish troops under General Haller to disembark at Danzig on their way to Poland where Paderewski maintains they are greatly needed to establish law and order and to stop the encroachments of the German army, euphemistically called “free corps,” now on the rampage in Silesia. And second, they absolutely refuse to permit members of the French military mission in Warsaw to enter, much less inspect, the territory east of the Vistula which they contend is illegally occupied by the Germans. In other words, as Foch advised the Colonel in a snappy memorandum, “The Germans refuse to conform to Article 16 of the Armistice protocol which reads:

“The Allied forces shall have free access to the territories to be evacuated by the Germans on the Eastern frontier whether through Dantzig or by the Vistula.

“This action means,” concludes Foch, “that the Germans now flatly refuse to comply with President Wilson’s Thirteenth Point which provides for the creation or rather the restoration of a free and independent Polish state with direct access to the sea—a condition of the Armistice which they so gladly accepted on November eleventh last.”

According to French sources the German Commissioners attached to their refusal what is considered here an impertinent inquiry. They are reported to have asked, “Is it true, as generally stated in the Paris press, that the German government will be summoned to sign the Peace Treaty without having been given an opportunity to see, much less to discuss, its terms?”

Foch holds that the inquiry should be ignored. “We are not accountable to the German government for our actions. Granting this request would only lead to interminable discussions,” is his comment. House recognizes that the majority of the delegates and the states they represent are unalterably opposed to a face-to-face discussion of the Treaty with the German envoys when they arrive, but he will insist upon giving them ample opportunity to discuss the terms in writing, and he is confident that Clemenceau will comply with his wishes in this matter which he considers so vital. Foch concluded the informal memorandum from which I am quoting with these words: “Whatever decision is arrived at as to these questions, we must prepare for the crisis in our relations which it is now quite evident the Germans are plotting”—in other words the march to Berlin, and it is an open secret that the French divisions that are to participate in it have already been assigned.

Even if the worst comes to the worst and once again the Germans treat a solemn treaty as a mere “scrap of paper,” it will be difficult to secure harmonious action from the allied and associated governments. Speaking particularly for the Americans, every one of them from major general to high private wants to go home. Mordacq told the Colonel yesterday that Clemenceau is of the opinion that the Germans are well aware of this état des âmes (one of the Tiger’s favorite expressions) and that they will exploit it to the limit.

But as a matter of fact the situation is not as simple as this; there are other angles to the problem. None of the Western Powers wish to send troops to the Eastern Front, and without the backing of troops the military commissions which are expected to take charge are powerless; again many of them, most of them in fact, are of the opinion that the German troops which have not been disbanded are the only available bulwark against the encroachments of the Bolsheviki and would like to send them reinforcements if it could be done without loss of “face.”

So, though regrettable, it is natural that the Germans, far from growing more amenable, are getting more cocky with the passing of every hour. With their excellent sources of information they probably know that many of the control officers have reported that if the Germans carry out the disarmament to which they are pledged nothing but an Allied army could prevent the Moscow people from overrunning Poland and parts of Rumania, certainly Bessarabia. Indeed it was only yesterday that the propaganda bureau of Trotsky announced that a reunion of all the Soviets will take place in Warsaw in April and that the revolutionary movement in Bessarabia and Wallachia is spreading rapidly. Paderewski is constantly sending the Colonel frantic appeals. He insists that only the arrival of men and of ample munitions can save the situation. He reports that the Bolshe are drawing nearer to the Dniester every day and that the more radical wing of the Ukrainians is getting out of hand in Eastern Galicia.

It is certainly a pretty kettle of fish, and Foch admits that even if they are enforced, and he claims that many of them are completely ignored, the articles of the Armistice protocol are not strong enough or elastic enough to control the situation. Even before the President left for America (February), Foch in a rather indirect manner suggested that something would have to be done: For instance, that a rather broad interpretation should be placed upon some of the Armistice provisions.

But Wilson, as was to be expected from a man of his integrity, absolutely declined to accept the suggestion or even to consider it should it be formally advanced. His answer was, “If the arrangements which we made are faulty, well, that is our lookout. I certainly will not agree to slip in provisions at this late day, however helpful they might prove. If it is a bad bargain, we must stand by it.” Mordacq’s comment—whether it is personal or inspired by Clemenceau we do not know—is, “If we cannot hold the Germans to the terms of the Armistice, what is the use of continuing to discuss the terms of the definite treaty, which cannot but prove even more unacceptable to the same unreliable gang?” answer to this is not broadcast but whispered under one’s breath, that “there is a no more reliable gang within sight.”