April 2, 1919

Note: After my scamper ninth General Smuts in Southeastern Europe (April 1, to 11), as related in Unfinished Business, I was back in my interpreter’s box for the League of Nations Commission. It may be noted that several entries in my diary bear dates of my absent days. Apparently I drew my information for these from my Colonel’s daybook and chronicled these events on the dates when they occurred, even though I was not on the spot at the time.

Some of the newspaper observers, more familiar with political customs at home than with the European scene, are beginning to sniff the air and to whisper that a “deal” is in progress between the mighty men here assembled. They admit it is for the purpose of inaugurating an era of peace and good will between the warring nations, but some say openly that they have gloomy forebodings as to the outcome. They may be right; they look at the situation from the outside and for once that may be the coign of vantage. I shall, however, view the scene as it appears to me from the inside although I do not pretend to know all the moves that are being made on the obscure checkerboard.

It is at least certain that the President returned from America (March 14) with a realistic sense of the obstacles in his path which had been lacking when he left six weeks before. He sees now after his contacts with the opposition in Washington that he is no longer dictator, in a good sense of the word, but that he must plead with his fellow delegates for concessions, even for favors, if the peace ship is not to come to grief on the rocks of a lee shore. He is putting on a brave face to the unwelcome task, but he is no longer absolutely confident of the outcome.

When the President went to America in February with the draft of the Covenant in his dispatch case he thought his troubles were over; that in the future there was to be plain sailing on summer seas. He had persuaded himself that the adverse vote in the November Senate and state elections meant nothing at all.¹ He placed reliance on the popular support for the great Charter and the adhesion to it of many state governors who apparently supported him in his crusade to bring fair dealing to a distracted world. During his stay of a month at home the President’s contacts with senators and congressmen and with those who follow closely the trends of public opinion have opened his eyes to the grim realities. Taft and Root, who at times have given him nonpartisan support, have convinced him that unless he puts over the Monroe Doctrine reservation his whole project of a new world order will collapse. Of course the famous doctrine is not involved in the New World edifice. It is simply a unilateral pronouncement affecting the Americas, but it is developing into a rallying cry for all who oppose Wilson’s “idealism,” as they call it, and who frankly want to get away from European entanglements and responsibilities. That would of course be splendid—were it possible.

The French and British statesmen are close observers of this change in sentiment, this radical swing of the pendulum, and being human and “patriotic” they will seek to profit by it. They will give Wilson his reservation, they will help him to pacify his opponents, but they will make him pay their price, they will demand their quid pro quo. The developing situation has given Lloyd George an opportunity to comment openly and rather boisterously upon what he calls his wisdom in insisting upon what some have termed in contempt his “Khaki election” (see page 255) while the cannon were still smoking from the four-years war. He has said to House several times, “All the world now knows that Britain is behind me. But is America behind Wilson?”

Then both George and Clemenceau admit that they, too, just like Wilson, are having trouble with parliamentary bodies who will have to be pacified. And there is Italy and Orlando, who concedes that his people are very restive about Fiume. The French Chamber and Senate is overwhelmingly in favor of the creation of a buffer state along the Rhine as a bulwark against future German aggression, or a hard and fast alliance between the Western Allies and America which would give the same security. And then, as always, Poland is a problem and suggested solutions certainly run counter to the Wilsonian principles. Lloyd George makes it quite plain that he wishes to withhold most of Silesia from the Poles. He argues that Silesia, with its ores and its political affiliations, in the control of Warsaw would give France a paramount position on the Continent and that Germany deprived of adequate supplies of coal and iron would no longer continue as Britain’s best customer.

In confidential talks with the Colonel, Orlando admits that intrinsically Fiume is not very important, but as a symbol for the flag-wavers like d’Annunzio he asserts it is vital to his continuance in office. “You have Trieste and Venice,” says the Colonel, “giving adequate facilities for a world commerce four times as great as Italy has ever enjoyed.”

“Quite true,” admits Orlando, “but with our World War experiences fresh in our mind we want to, we must, keep the Adriatic as a mare clausum, a closed sea, otherwise the superpatriotic orators will declare that our situation is only changed in name but not in fact. To our hurt and embarrassment Yugoslavia will have taken the place of Austria, and everything will be quite as unsatisfactory as before.” House would give France satisfaction on the Rhine, but he opposes the partition of Silesia or even the proposed plebiscite, so dear to Lloyd George for reasons which I have given in detail elsewhere. (See Chapter VII.) He thinks the President should hold out on Fiume or at most accept League of Nation control for a specified period to be followed later on when the situation may have quieted down by a “free and fair” election. But he admits the President will have to yield a point or two or withdraw from the Conference, which would mean a world smash. His choice is this: in the Council of Four he must placate Clemenceau or George, one or the other, otherwise the crusade for peace will end badly.

An amusing story has come from Washington. Cabot Lodge is reported to have said, “Wilson’s difficulties are wholly imaginary. We can and should shape the Paris picnic according to our wishes as long as we hold on to the lunch basket.” That may have been true last fall, but it is not true today. As always, benefits are quickly forgotten and on November 11 last, control of the European situation passed out of the President’s hands. Today he realizes it, and some of the most valuable provisions of the Covenant and the Treaty are being jettisoned to save the ship that is making heavy weather.