March 23d

The first of the meetings of the Commission, since the return of the President from Washington, to review and indeed to revise the draft of February 14th, was held on March 22d in the afternoon and it lasted from three to seven. The Preamble and the first eight Articles were simply read, rather than discussed, yet it was quite apparent that the atmosphere of the future sessions was to be quite different from that which had prevailed in the past. While, as to the main points, the antagonists did not unmask their heavy guns or reveal their new objectives, it was clear that they all appreciated the awkward position in which Wilson had been placed by the hostile criticism of the first draft by so many of the Senators. The French were now encouraged to bargain more closely about the Rhine frontier, and Lloyd George was evidently seeking to secure a commitment for naval equality in return for his acquiescence in the Monroe Doctrine reservation. It was also clear that Sonnino would be more insistent with his Adriatic claims.

However, on the surface the session opened very quietly. At the suggestion of Wilson, presiding, Cecil explained that, under his chairmanship, there had been two meetings with thirteen representatives of neutral governments:

“I am happy to add that they all gave general approval to the Covenant.”

The usually taciturn Makino (Japan) now went into action. He proposed an amendment to Article XII providing for a suspension of military preparations while a dispute was under examination. Textually it read:

“From the time a dispute is submitted to arbitration, or to inquiry, by the Executive Council, and until the aforesaid term of three months shall have elapsed, the parties to the dispute shall refrain from making any military preparations.”

(It was sent on to the Drafting Committee.) We shall hear more about this proposal later.

Cecil proposed an amendment to Article II. It read:

The proceedings of the Body of Delegates (afterwards known as the Assembly) shall be made public unless it is otherwise determined.”

Larnaude opposed this—vehemently. Orlando suggested that the question be left to the experience of the future and Cecil withdrew his amendment. He then proposed that the number of representatives for each member state in the Assembly be raised from three to five. This provoked discussion and the amendment was withdrawn or postponed (ultimately it was adopted).

Hymans again proposed Brussels as the seat of the League. Wilson remained silent, probably because he has already made known his opposition to the Belgian proposal in personal talks with most of the delegates. He has stated that it would be advisable to have the seat of the League placed in a country that has not been engaged in the war. Not a single voice was raised in favor of Brussels; even the French did not support the proposal. The British are now all in favor of Geneva. While further consideration was postponed, it is evident to all that the question is settled. Geneva is to have a rebirth as the seat of the Parliament of Man.¹

Senator Hitchcock, upon whom will devolve the duty of guiding the Treaty and the Covenant to the desired goal of ratification by the Senate, on March the fourth wrote the President a letter giving his views on the prospect. He also sent a copy to Colonel House. In brief, it reads:

“In my opinion, some of the Senators, even those who signed the Lodge manifesto on the Covenant and the League Constitution, will vote for it, I think, if it is a part of the Peace Treaty; and more will vote for it if certain amendments are made. Among these I would like to mention a reservation giving each of the High Contracting Parties exclusive control over domestic subjects. Also, a reservation on the Monroe Doctrine and a provision by which on proper notice a member state can withdraw from the union. It is important that definite assurance should be given that it is optional for any nation to accept or reject the burden of a mandate.”

It is only too evident that the troubles with which they are faced in Washington blind at least some of the Senators to the witches’ broth they are helping to brew here.

I here insert an account of our first contact with the neutrals.

This afternoon (March 20th) for the first time representatives of many of the smaller states which remained neutral during the war assembled in the Crillon and expressed formally their opinions as to the proposed League of Nations. The Swiss demanded that the permanent neutrality of their Confederation be recognized. The delegates of the Netherlands, of Norway and of Denmark, spoke at great length, and it is apparent that they share the same objections—which is fortunate and timesaving. M. Neergard, former Premier of Denmark, requested that the smaller states be given larger representation on what he called the “Executive Council of the League.” For himself and his colleagues he said they were all in agreement in demanding a radical limitation of armaments and in forbidding the private manufacture of arms, munitions, etc. They also insisted that none of the smaller states should be called upon to enforce military or economic measures against an offending nation “unless they should have participated in the deliberations at which the decision was reached and should have formally approved of it.” This was regarded by all as a reasonable request. Then the Danes advanced another request which is sure to meet with opposition. It was to the effect that any state which remained neutral in the last war, even though it had become a member of the League, could declare permanent neutrality and so be relieved from the obligation of taking part in any military action against an aggressor in the future. Also that its territory should be declared inviolable and that the passage of League troops across its territory be forbidden. The former Premier admitted that public opinion in his country had not crystallized as yet on this position but that in his judgment it was unanimous in favor of securing these reservations to be availed of when and if it seemed desirable. Wedel Jarlsberg (Norway) wished inserted a reservation to the effect that the smaller states would not be called upon to participate in military measures against states not members of the League. Lord Robert Cecil, speaking at some length, poured oil on the waters which began to look distinctly troubled. His interpretation of these provisions of the Covenant was that the smaller states would only be obligated to economic sanctions against offending nations. On the other hand, he insisted that they would have to permit the passage of troops that were proceeding against a nation rebellious to the decrees of the League.

Frankly, flatly, but not as violently as is his wont, Léon Bourgeois (France) opposed these suggested reservations. “All these reservations were nullifying,” he declared. Adhesion to the League made all such conceptions of neutrality impossible. Then M. Loudon, former Minister of Foreign Affairs for the Netherlands, and long their popular representative in Washington, inquired: “Are all alliances defensive as well as offensive between the states forbidden by the Covenant?” M. Venizelos answered this rather vaguely. “In his judgment,” he said, “in the new World Organization there would be found a place for purely defensive alliances.”

House thanked all the delegates for their co-operation and dwelt on the fact, in his usual suave manner, that in a brief two hours of council all difficulties had been smoothed away. As we returned to our office I asked the Colonel to be more explicit, and then he said, “There has been no explosion or public indictment of the Great Powers, the ‘big bad wolves,’ for dragooning the little lambs, and that is what I apprehended—and not without reason.”

Before the thirteenth meeting of the Commission, on March 26th, 8:30 p.m., the third since the return of the President, many negotiations “on the side” were in progress. Lloyd George and Clemenceau fully understood the President’s plight in view of the situation in Washington, and they were, as stated more fully elsewhere, determined to profit by it. Clemenceau was now insisting on a better frontier, quite naturally, and Lloyd George professed increasing anxiety as to our naval expansion. These and other red-hot amendments are on the table or in the dispatch cases of the delegates, ready to be produced at any moment. To secure a cooling-off period, the President read a letter from the Swiss Government, asking formally that Geneva be selected as the seat of the League. Hymans made his third or fourth plea for Brussels, and a subcommittee was then appointed to study the subject and make recommendations. It was apparent that nearly all the delegates favored Geneva, although Larnaude maintained that the neutrality, which the Swiss wish to preserve, did not harmonize with this choice and would nullify it.

In consequence, as was natural, at this session there was considerable discussion of the peculiar position of the Swiss and a memorandum, drawn up I believe by M. Rappard, that had been filed with the Commission was turned over to a subcommittee for examination and report. In part it reads:

“Even if, as Switzerland desires, the League of Nations succeeds in legally and practically prohibiting war in the present meaning of the word, Switzerland must adhere to her traditional neutrality on account of the military executions (“sanctions” probably meant) which the League might be obliged to decree. In maintaining her neutrality Switzerland would then render greater service to the League than she could in taking active part in military measures even if these should be directed against some of her near neighbors.

* * *

In a private meeting, preliminary to the formal session, Cecil proposed what he called a slight change in Article X by adding the words: “Subject to the provisions of Article XXIV” (now Article XIX).

Its purpose was to empower the Assembly (of the League) to advise on the reconsideration of existing treaties. Cecil thought that this addition would clarify, and yet by no means lessen, the responsibility that was implicit in the Article. Wilson did not agree. He said this was the Article on which the French relied for their security. He thought the change would weaken this important provision and he declined to accept it.

The question of withdrawal, which Washington, or at least many Senators, insist upon, now loomed on the horizon. However, before this problem was tackled an addition to the Mandate Article was agreed to. It provided that it was entirely optional with a state to decline or accept a mandate. Cecil drafted and presented it at the request of House.

Then, suddenly, the withdrawal provision was by unanimous consent sidetracked and the proposal that the domestic affairs of the states, members of the League, should not be regarded as within the province of the League was taken up. This brought in the Japanese and the Irish problem and so while escaping from the frying pan, we most certainly fell into the fire! And on these subjects the President spoke at unusual length. As a constitutional lawyer, he thought the Federal Government had the right to override state land laws. If it did so in California, the question would be between the state and Washington and not between the United States and Japan. He said an Irish delegation had called on him, while he was at home, and sought to extract from him a pledge that he would ask the Peace Conference to make Ireland independent.

“I refused, of course. Since my return here I have taken up the problem with Mr. Lloyd George and I have asked him what he wanted done, if anything could be done. I told him,” continued the President, “that the consequences of avoiding the issue might be that the Irish would start a campaign in the United States against the League and so raise racial and religious questions that we all wished to avoid. I am confident that such a campaign would be overwhelmingly defeated and that perhaps it might even contribute to the success of the League. My first impulse was to tell the Irish to go to hell, but, feeling that this would not be the act of a statesman, I denied myself this personal satisfaction.”

Then, turning to Cecil, the President added:

“However, sooner or later, I fear a discussion of the Irish question in its relation to the League is inevitable.”

With a melancholy nod of the head, Cecil acquiesced in this conclusion.

Continuing, the President said:

“It is apparent that many of the Irish organizations are convinced that by starting this discussion, and even provoking incidents here and there, they will compel international attention to their problem. All this leads up,” explained the President, “to my fear that if we adopt an article excluding any interference in the domestic affairs of a state, member of the League, the Irish will regard it as a direct shot at them. Undoubtedly this would prove the tocsin for the outbreak of the AntiLeague campaign in several countries which we all wish to escape—if possible.”

The domestic-affairs article was now laid aside and there followed a great deal of rather desultory talk about the Monroe Doctrine reservation in which the President, House, and Cecil participated. Many of the drafts of the proposed reservation were gone over, including that of Senator Hitchcock, also Cecil’s, and one that came from Senator Root by cable to Mr. Lamont. The only agreement arrived at before the discussion ended seemed to be that the Monroe Doctrine reservation should later on be bracketed with the somewhat similar Japanese doctrine in regard to continental Asia. Then the whole discussion went over for a subsequent meeting.

(In the main, the amendment to Article XV, ultimately arrived at, was in the language of former President Taft which came to House last week by cable.)