Berlin, October 1st

I have not written a line or raised a finger, and yet it has been arranged that I am to see Herr Ebert, the former harness maker, now the chief magistrate of the new German Republic-Reich on Tuesday next. What a change in procedure and protocol since the imperial days of William der Siegreicher and Frederick the Peace-loving, and of Bismarck, the Man of Blood and Iron! It will be difficult to display no surprise at the way all doors fly open, in the Berlin I once knew so well, when they were all close shut, especially to newsmen. How well I remember my first approach to the great men here, the treasured letter from the Ambassador in Washington to a Vortragender Rath at the Foreign Office, and the surly greeting of the sentry as I sought to present it. “Zehn Schritte vom Lieb [Ten steps from my body]” were the words with which he greeted me. Warm—yes—but certainly not cordial. I had come up the wrong stairway, the one reserved for mighty men in uniform.

What a contrast this confrontation will be with the hours I spent in Friedricsruh with the Old Pilot, who had so recently been tossed off the bridge into the stormy waters by the young Sailor-Emperor, who maintained that the future of his Germany was on this uneasy element which Britannia had ruled for so many years. How Bismarck growled and grouched over the decay of the Hohenzollern brood which he ascribed to the unfortunate marriage with “Vicky,” the English princess.

B. urges me, if I must wear a collar when I call on Herr Ebert, to leave it unbuttoned, the fashion which the new chief magistrate follows, but he insists that Ebert is an honorable man, and all seem to agree that a better choice for this unenviable post could not have been made.

Unfortunately I left Berlin before the day of this meeting, which would have proved interesting, I am sure.

* * *

… In the second of the October (1919) meetings of the Committee investigating the conduct of the war, an effort was made by several of the members to induce the former Chancellor, while on the stand, to admit that his peace moves were hampered and in the end nullified by the inflammatory propaganda and false statements that were issued by the press bureaus of the army and the navy, and they placed in evidence a statement for which they made a certain Herr David responsible. He had been a Minister of State in the Bethmann-Hollweg administration and he was reported as saying:

“While the political branch of the government was urging upon Wilson the advisability of making a peace move, which might well have proved the salvation of our country, a poisonous hatred of Wilson and the people of America was being instilled into the hearts of our folk by the publicity machinery of the High Army Command.”

The former Chancellor did not wish to go into this question. He protested that he had been far too busy with more important matters at the time. The chairman then produced a telegram which he said the then Chancellor, and the present witness, had sent to von Falkenhayn, who had now succeeded von Moltke in the command of the German armies. After but a moment’s hesitation, Bethmann-Hollweg admitted: “Yes, I sent that telegram under date of February 5th (1916). I complained to the army commander that the censorship, largely under his control, was giving complete license to such papers as the Cologne Volkszeitung and the Kreuzzeitung to continue their campaign in favor of a renewal of U-boat warfare in its most rigorous form despite the engagements we had given to the American Government. As you see, I told the general that these publications were hampering my government and interfering with a satisfactory settlement of the Lusitania controversy which we sought. I did all I could to stop this press campaign, with some temporary success, but after a very few weeks it was resumed. Yes, I cannot deny the statement of Herr David, but I will say it was difficult to place responsibilities. There was much confusion in the situation and at times sharp conflict between the civilian, the naval, and the military authorities in matters of press control and censorship.’’

At this point in his examination—his second appearance on the stand—Bethmann-Hollweg was shown a memorandum dated January 2, 1917, drawn up and signed by the steering committee of the Catholic Center party, the most numerous and powerful group in the Reichstag at the time. He was asked if he remembered having received it. He said he did.

“What did you think of it?” inquired the chairman.

“I thought it very important,” was the answer.

This document, perhaps the most revealing of the series, reads: “As to the question whether the new U-boat warfare is necessary, the decision should rest with Field Marshal von Hindenburg. It is our desire that the Imperial Chancellor conform his course to the wishes of the field marshal. If he does he will have the unanimous support of our party.”

The comment on this made by the national assemblyman who guided my researches was: “That ended Bethmann’s weak and ineffective resistance to the war lords. Without the support of the Center he could not have survived for a day. Of course he could have resigned from the government, but probably because he saw he could not change its course by an inch he decided to swim with the flowing tide.”¹

Out of these interminable hearings, many of which I attended and at all of which I was represented, I have drawn one excellent suggestion; at least I think so. On the eve of my departure from Berlin, I put to Count Bernstorff the following question:

“What, in your judgment, would have happened in January 1917 if, instead of declaring for the indiscriminate use of the submarine weapon, Berlin had said to Washington: We would welcome the mediation of America. We believe that if negotiations are initiated a reasonable peace would result’? What, in your judgment, would have happened?”

“I believed then, while still in Washington,” said Bernstorff, “that there was a fifty-fifty chance of success, but with the more complete knowledge of the military, political, and economic situation which I acquired within a few days of my arrival in Berlin, I was and still am confident that the negotiations would have been successful.”²

So, two years more of devastating war might have been avoided if there had been in existence practical machinery for bringing the enemy states into a conference. Well, while as yet untested, certainly the League of Nations provides that very agency.