April 12th

The fact that John Bull is out for a bargain, and, as it appears, a pretty sharp bargain at that, has been apparent ever since the President returned from Washington with his belated appreciation of the power of the Senate and with the peremptory demand of a group of Senators to secure the Monroe Doctrine reservation. At first this change of course was revealed but certainly not stressed by a remark here, and a suggestion there, which left no trace and most certainly could not be ascribed to an official source. Then, however, the extreme timeliness of the present moment for reaching a naval agreement between the two great sea powers was mentioned by important men in more or less formal conversations. Finally, on April 8th, after conferring with the President, House decided to put on record this unwelcome development, and on that day he wrote Lloyd George as follows:

“When I asked you yesterday if you had any objection to the affirmation of the Monroe Doctrine (in the Covenant), you told me, as you have told me before, that you could not consent without coming to an agreement with the United States regarding our naval building program.”

House had decided to write this letter forcing the issue not only because of the somewhat vague talks with Lloyd George, but because of the way in which Cecil had described the situation in a letter to him written several days ago. This letter read:

“I have found in exalted quarters that some of the recent utterances of high officials connected with the United States Navy (he referred to a statement ascribed to Admiral Benson, naval adviser of our delegation) have produced a very unfortunate impression. Very possibly they have been misunderstood, but they have, in fact, conveyed the idea that the naval policy of America is one of expansion, that the American ambition is to have a navy at least as strong, or stronger, than that of the British Empire. It is urged, with some force, that such an attitude is wholly inconsistent with the conception of the League of Nations and that if it really .represents the settled policy of the United States, it could only lead, sooner or later, to a competition in arms between us and them. . . . Would it be possible, for instance, for you to say that when the Treaty of Peace, containing the League, has been signed, you would abandon or modify your naval program? I am sure the British Government would be only too ready to give corresponding assurances. That would be what the French call a beau geste with which to inaugurate the League.”

House replied the same day in these terms:

“I have been unable to see any connection between the two questions (the Monroe Doctrine reservation and the Naval Program proposal). If the kind of peace is made for which we are working, and which includes a League of Nations, it will be necessary for us to live up to its spirit. To do this, none of us can consistently continue to increase our armament either by land or by sea.”

On the ninth this letter was submitted to him by House, and having been approved by the President, was sent on to its destination. Late in the afternoon Cecil informed House that the letter was not satisfactory to Lloyd George and quite a discussion followed. House told Cecil with more than his usual bluntness that the United States was not open to a bargain on the Monroe Doctrine reservation but was going to take the position it believes to be right. He did not want his letter as to the Naval Program sent back (Cecil had offered to do so) because it represented the settled policy of the United States and it would not be reconsidered.

“We are presenting the Monroe Doctrine amendment to the Commission this evening. We would like your support, but of course you can oppose it if you see fit.”

Cecil was evidently greatly worried and admitted that he could not promise British support. He was given a copy of the amendment as finally drawn up. It now read:

“Nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of international engagements such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings, like the Monroe Doctrine, for securing the maintenance of peace.”

A few hours later (at the fourteenth meeting) the President formally presented his amendment and it was adopted. By his silence, Cecil gave his consent, and the President was pleased. He recognized that an outstanding obstacle to ratification by the Senate had been successfully negotiated, and House also breathed more freely. Cecil did suggest that the amendment be not added to Article X, but should form a separate Article, and this was agreed to.

When Cecil accepted the Monroe reservation, which evidently he had always wished to do, he again opposed a definition of it, frequently asked for and even demanded by Larnaude and Reis, and this was most pleasing to the President.

“If we attempted that,” he said in his supporting plea, “we might well run the risk of limiting or extending its application and none of us wish to do that.” But the French delegates were far from being appeased. Bourgeois was boisterous in his dissent and Larnaude said he would fight it out in the Plenary where all Europe would hear.

“That sounds’quite menacing,” I said to House. “Are you not afraid of a row in the Plenary?”

“Not at all,” answered the Colonel suavely. “I spoke to Clemenceau this morning and he assured me he would not recognize either one of his delegates on the great day, and then the Tiger added, ‘Larnaude is getting on my nerves and Bourgeois is sapping my vitality.’ No,” concluded the Colonel, “have no fear, the Monroe Doctrine reservation is in the bag.”