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    Authority to ratify the Treaty of Versailles was given the President of the Republic by the Chamber yesterday, by a vote of 372 to 53. It was not the victoire éclatante which Clemenceau hoped for but hardly expected. The fact that 73 deputies abstained from voting was a significant feature of the balloting. I hope we shall do as well in Washington.

    Barrés made quite a few “critical observations” (as he called them) on behalf of his group. He said the Treaty was accepted as a “continuing creation—that the Chamber must be allowed to work hand in hand with the government in the practical execution of the Peace arrangements. Frequent reports to the Chamber must be made by the various commissions on reparations and control, and with this understanding we accept the Treaty.”

    Many deputies like Jacques Piou voted “yes” “mais avec quelques réserves Delahaye spoke against, and M. Maginot, the former Minister of War, said, speaking for himself and his colleagues of the liberated regions, he voted to reject the Treaty because it did not give les certitudes to which the French people were entitled. “It is not acceptable to the people of the frontier provinces,” he shouted, “because by it their security is not fully safeguarded.” The Socialists split; some approved “because it wipes out 1870.” Another group rejected it in the words of Ernest Lafont, “because it does not bring peace.”

    Barthou, certainly no friend of Clemenceau, at considerable length expressed his regret that the annexation of the Rhine provinces had not been secured, but he added: “Can anyone deny the imposing force of the guarantees which we receive? Things are not as they were in 1914. Great Britain and the United States have recognized that the security of France is indispensable to the peace of the world; in fact, they now concede that a threat from Germany is not merely a danger to France but a menace to the Allies, to Europe, to the world.”

    Franklin-Bouillon denounced the League of Nations as deplorably weak, “and, if the United States does not come in, it would prove to be merely another scrap of paper.” He added, “Of course the Rhine Agreement promising aid from Britain and from the United States in case of another German invasion is in some measure reassuring, but will the United States ratify the pledge of the President? And if ratification is secured, the guarantee seems to me very limited. To illustrate my doubts: suppose Germany invades Poland and France goes to her aid, as she is pledged to do, what would the Allies do? In my judgment, the guarantee would not be operative and they would be at liberty to stand aside, to consult their own exclusive interests, quoi?”

    This debate really began on August 26th and its course at first was rather languid. Tardieu glossed over what he admits are the shortcomings of the document, but dwelt with satisfaction on what he calls “the inestimable advantages of the Treaty and the pledge of immediate assistance from Great Britain and America in case of aggression.”

    Certainly it cannot be said that the news of the ratification in the Chamber (it is understood there will be no opposition in the Senate) has been received with rapture. There is little comment, and when interrogated, people generally say: “C’est une paix de vigilance—mats c’est la Paix” or “It is a peace pact that will require watching—but after all it is peace.” After four long years of war that is something; in fact a great deal.

    In the Figaro of October 4th, Alfred Capus of the French Academy hails the parliamentary victory of Clemenceau with these words: “This vote, particularly significant because of the way the Socialists fell apart, will certainly contribute to calm the nerves of our people, and above all to exorcise the phantoms by which so many have been obsessed for months. Now the petty discussions are finished. The most éclatante victoire de notre pays has received popular approval. It will bring safety and prosperity if from this day we turn over a new leaf and cease to tear ourselves to pieces.”

    Everybody is asking me about the Treaty outlook in Washington, but as I know nothing, I say nothing. What information reaches me would indicate that the Treaty is in for hard sledding on the other side of the water, but that I keep to myself, in the hope that when in a few days I reach home the outlook will be brighter.

    A few hours later the Treaty of Guarantee, as it is called here, by which Great Britain and the United States are pledged to come to the assistance of France to repel an unprovoked attack by Germany was submitted to the Chamber and approved unanimously. The guarantee is joint, not single. Britain will only be bound in case America ratifies. Well, in any case, Foch and Briand are defeated but I fear not routed.1

    Footnotes

    1. I radioed the news to the Colonel, and in his reply was a message of congratulations to the Tiger and an expression of hope that the Treaty would be even more successful in our Senate. The Colonel is convinced that this is the moment for Clemenceau to resign, and has told him so, frequently.
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