Fifteenth Meeting, April 11, 1919, at 8:30 p.m. (evening session)

M. Larnaude presented in a new form a compromise with regard to the Monroe Doctrine. When discussed at the last meeting it had been agreed that the provisions relating to this doctrine should be inserted under Article XX. He thought that the Commission was not wholly in agreement on this question; so, in order to obtain unanimity, he now proposed the following text:

“International understandings intended to assure the maintenance of peace, such as treaties of arbitration, are not considered as incompatible with the provisions of this Covenant. Likewise with regard to understandings or doctrines pertaining to certain regions, such as the Monroe Doctrine, in so far as they do not in any way prevent the signatory States from executing their obligations under this Covenant.” This wording indicated that the Monroe Doctrine must not create obstacles to the fulfillment of obligations arising out of the present Covenant, and stated in so many words what President Wilson had said at the previous meeting. “The President’s statement, however, would only appear in the Minutes,” argued Larnaude. “If they should be included in the Covenant, they would relieve the apprehension suggested by the present form.” President Wilson had said the day before that the Monroe Doctrine was compatible with obligations arising out of the Covenant; it was the purpose of M. Larnaude’s amendment to state this fact rather than leave it unstated. Furthermore, in mentioning the Monroe Doctrine a special and privileged place had been given to the United States.

President Wilson feared that the proposed text would create the impression that there was an incompatibility between the Monroe Doctrine and the obligations of the Covenant and that an unwarranted suspicion would thus be cast upon the Doctrine.

M. Larnaude protested against this interpretation. He said that the proposed text was intended to clarify the situation by correcting the ill-informed opinion that the Monroe Doctrine prevented Europe from taking a hand in American affairs and America from participating in the settlement of European questions. This misapprehension would be corrected if it were specifically stated that the Doctrine was not incompatible with the obligations arising out of the Covenant.

Lord Robert Cecil said that he did not desire either to support or to oppose the amendment. He merely wished to inquire whether this amendment would be likely to satisfy the criticisms ‘ and the fears which had arisen in the United States.

President Wilson remarked that there was no fear in America that the Monroe Doctrine was contrary to the obligations of the Covenant. There was, however, a fear that the Covenant might to some extent invalidate the Monroe Doctrine. If there were anything in the Doctrine inconsistent with the Covenant, the Covenant would take precedence over the Monroe Doctrine not only because it was subsequent to it, but because it constituted a body of definite international engagements. No one could doubt that if the United States subscribed to these engagements, they would carry them out.

M. Larnaude was of opinion that his amendment would satisfy French anxieties and would not cause any dissatisfaction in the United States. What objection could there be to stating explicitly something which was known the world over? If there were the least implication of suspicion in his amendment another formula might be found which would eliminate this suspicion and still preserve the principle of his amendment. He thought it was necessary to do this in order to secure the unanimous approval of the Commission.

M. Bourgeois remarked that the French amendment was based upon two different ideas: First, it was intended to state that there was no incompatibility between the Covenant and the Monroe Doctrine; second, it associated with this Doctrine a group of ideas and understandings which likewise were intended to secure peace and which, consequently, were to be considered as understandings compatible with the Covenant. In this way a general principle was laid down and the Monroe Doctrine was made a particular application of this principle.

Mr. Kramar asked whether in case of dispute between Paraguay and Uruguay the League of Nations would have the right to come to the aid of whichever of the two states was supported by the decision of the Executive Council.

President Wilson replied in the affirmative.

Lord Robert Cecil believed that the Monroe Doctrine would in no wise prevent the forces of a European state from going to America in order to defend the rights of the oppressed. The sole object of the Monroe Doctrine was to prevent any European power from acquiring any influence, territory, or political supremacy on the American continent. The idea that the Monroe Doctrine would prevent the Executive Council, in the execution of a unanimous decision, from acting in Europe, America, Africa, or Asia, was a perversion of the Monroe Doctrine, and citizens of the United States would be the first to disclaim it.

President Wilson agreed.

Mr. Koo said that he was reluctant to prolong discussion of this amendment inasmuch as the Commission had discussed it for a long time on the previous day. Nevertheless, he thought that if the amendment which he had proposed at the previous meeting were adopted, the objections of the French and Czechoslovak delegations, as well as his own, would be met. He had suggested adding after the word “Understandings” the following clause:

“Which are not incompatible with the terms of this Covenant and which are intended to assure the maintenance of peace, such as the Monroe Doctrine.”

President Wilson made the same objections to this amendment which he had made to the French.

Mr. Koo proposed to add the words “or understandings” after the word “obligations” in the second line of the first paragraph of Article XX.

This amendment was adopted.

M. Larnaude proposed a new draft which was intended to correct the impression of suspicion in his first draft. The second sentence of his amendment was now to read as follows:

“Similarly with regard to all other arrangements, particularly those pertaining to certain regions, such as arise out of the Monroe Doctrine, in so far as they conduce to the maintenance of the peace which it is the object of this Covenant to assure.”

President Wilson thought that this draft was not satisfactory. Moreover, a provision with regard to the Monroe Doctrine had been accepted the day before, and the Commission had decided to make a separate Article of it.

M. Larnaude declared that if this were the case the French delegation would be obliged to make a reservation.

President Wilson asked whether this reservation indicated that the French delegation would publicly oppose the American amendment. He thought that such a situation would create a most unfortunate impression on the other side of the water.

M. Bourgeois had no intention of creating such an impression in the United States, but he wanted to avoid discussions which might take place before the Plenary Conference and in the press. He thought that this result would be secured if the draft proposed by M. Larnaude were adopted.

President Wilson declared that the amendment was not adopted.

It is quite apparent that the French are determined to make a final stand and thresh the whole subject out once again in the Plenary Session of the Conference. To prevent this the Colonel is girding up his loins!