February 15th

The tenth and last meeting of the Drafting Commission, Lord Robert Cecil presiding in the absence of Mr. Wilson, was held on the afternoon of February 13th. It was marked by protracted debates on the French amendments. In the strongest form they called for an international force, a sheriff’s posse to enforce the decisions of the League Council. In the mildest form they provide an international staff to prepare for and to cope with military emergencies as they arise. They were all voted down, but the French were successful in having an addition made to Article IX which reads:

“A permanent commission shall be constituted to advise the League on the execution of Article VIII and on military and naval questions generally.”

Kramar (Czechoslovakia) sought to amend Article VII by an amendment to the effect that the military and naval restrictions imposed on Germany should not be affected by her subsequent admission to the League. This was voted down.

There followed a long debate as to the manner in which the exchange of military information between the States, members of the League, should be carried out. M. Diamandy (Roumania) thought the exchange should be obligatory, not merely voluntary. Kramar then said:

“On this subject I have deep anxiety. I share the apprehension of the French delegates. From the day Germany is admitted into the League we shall be obliged to depend on her good faith. I am not alone in not having confidence in her good faith. As between the Allies, supervision of military changes is not necessary, but as far as Germany is concerned, we should be vigilant. I know the Germans well and I have no confidence in them.”

“I am satisfied,” said Larnaude (France), “with the control we have established over the rearmament of Germany in her present situation, but once Germany is admitted—what then?”

Venizelos (Greece) said:

“We should, of course, impose on Germany, as a condition to her admission, our right to control her military activities.”

Kramar then proposed this addition to the Article:

“Special control conditions affecting military and naval forces, imposed on any State by the Treaty of Peace, shall not be weakened or in any way affected by its subsequent admission into the League.” Cecil, presiding, now advanced the suggestion that the military authorities of each nation would keep the League correctly informed as to possible military preparations. To this Larnaude disagreed vehemently.

“We know only too well that the experts are frequendy caught napping and not seldom are misinformed. Let me give one illustration. At Charleroi, at the beginning of the war, we were confronted by thirty more German divisions than our experts told us it was possible for them to bring into action.”

M. Bourgeois: “Public opinion in France is unanimous in demanding an effective form of supervision and I must ask for a vote.”

The French plan was now disapproved by a vote of twelve to three, only Bourgeois, Larnaude, and Kramar voting for it.

Kramar’s amendment, an addition to the Article, was now taken up and voted down. Speaking for it, Kramar said:

“The Germans are even now asking for admission into the League; very soon, in the name of justice and equal treatment, you will not have the strength to refuse them. It is not necessary to supervise the military activities of the Allies, but there must be an absolute control of the German armed forces.”

M. Jacquemyns, substituting for M. Hymans (Belgium):

“I, and the whole Belgian nation, share M. Kramar’s distrust of the German Government and people, but in our judgment no precautions will be of any avail until the German mentality has undergone a change. In our view the only effective precaution is to refuse her admission into the League. Once admitted, she would say: ‘This is my house quite as much as yours. I insist upon equal treatment and footing.’”

Kramar’s proposal was voted down. I do not recall the vote, but it was overwhelming.

Bourgeois now returned to the attack and spoke at great length in favor of his original proposal. In brief, his argument was about as follows:

“The lessons of the recent past demonstrate the fact that the risk of sudden aggression is very great and that it can only be met by an international army composed of contingents of the associated nations always prepared for joint, concerted action. Unless we make these preparations well in advance, it is certain that much time will elapse before the associated contingents can become really effective. As in 1914, in Belgium, regions important to our military defense would be invaded and devastated. Is this wise? Should we not prepare for eventualities which are really probabilities? In view of the opposition which it has provoked, we of the French delegation have abandoned our plan for an international army and even for an international staff always in being, but I do ask now for your approval of this amendment.” It read:

“A permanent organism for study and preparation which shall have the special mandate of insuring effective defense in case of aggression.”

Cecil (Britain) said that this would mean that plans would have to be drawn up to meet the possible invasion of all countries. Larnaude replied that this was a caricature of the idea that was in the mind of his colleague, and indeed of the French people. Undoubtedly it had been the practice in the past for the German General Staff to work out plans for the invasion of every country in the world, and similar plans might well be prepared by them in the near future. “We must be prudent and plan against the danger of such invasions. It is absurd to think that the League of Nations will be able to impose peace unless the world knows that she has at hand the means to do it, and to do it promptly.”

Bourgeois: “If no preparations are made, we shall be surprised as we were in the past. Through want of preparation and foresight, we suffered losses which I fear are irreparable. But when we created a united front, we secured the victory.”

Cecil: “I understand the view of my French colleagues, but my thought is, if we try to do too much, we shall accomplish nothing. I have gone as far in this matter as the public opinion of my country will support me.”

Larnaude: “We pay homage to Sir Robert in full appreciation of the spirit of conciliation which he has always shown. We have now brought before you the considered judgment of the French delegation. If we are defeated, we shall remain good friends, but we shall also remain of our former opinion and—with our fears.”

Bourgeois’ original amendment, which he called “A practical application of Article IX,” read:

“In case of aggression, menace or danger of aggression, the Council of the League will see to the measures suitable for insuring the execution of the obligations.”

The amendment was defeated. I have no record of the vote, but it was decisive.

Bourgeois now tried the patience of the Commission which had been worn somewhat thin by many of his long and rambling speeches at previous sessions in favor of some recognition of the pioneer work of The Hague Conference. He insisted that his nosegay of approval and grateful recognition be inserted in the Preamble or at some other appropriate place in the Covenant. When this plan was first proposed, President Wilson had asked Colonel House to assure M. Bourgeois that he fully appreciated the work he and his colleagues had done at The Hague, but that he did not think it wise to remind the world of the complete failure of the first assault that had been made upon the entrenched positions of the predatory powers. However, today Bourgeois resumed his attack and developed at great length all his previous arguments.

“It is a serious matter,” he said, “to ignore completely what we did at The Hague in 1899 and in 1907. Many, inspired by motives that I shall not characterize, have sought to discredit the first great attempt of the civilized nations to organize a regime of peace and justice in the world. If we pass over in silence what was then attempted, we should appear to condone, even to approve, their words of criticism, and indeed of ridicule. It would be a great mistake if we do not uphold the work that was attempted at The Hague. In fact we should be its most ardent champions. I am proud to have been there, and I do not think that our work was ineffective or should be passed over in silence. I am proud that I was intimately associated with the representatives of the United States, of Great Britain, and with the spokesmen of thirty-two forward-looking and law-abiding countries, who on that historic occasion declared their adherence to the rule of law and to a regime of international justice. That was noble pioneer work, and it should not be forgotten. I think, indeed, it should be emphasized, and proclaimed, that there are real achievements to the credit of our organization. Through arbitration we prevented war between Russia and England over the Dogger Bank incident; between Germany and France when the deserters were arrested at Casablanca; between France and Italy at the time of the Carthage dispute. I therefore formally ask that mention of these notable achievements be inserted in the Preamble.”

Cecil, speaking from the chair, said:

“Nobody thinks of forgetting the notable work of The Hague Conference. The question is one of form. Is its insertion suitable?”

Bourgeois: “It is not a question of form, it is a question of vital importance.”

Here Venizelos, by an innocent question, most certainly did not pour oil on the troubled waters:

“Is there really a permanent Court of Justice at The Hague?” he inquired.

Flushing deeply, Bourgeois answered:

“I have the honor to be one of its members.”

Hymans (Belgium) now endeavored to have added to the mandate Article words which he said would safeguard and clarify its meaning, but he was urged both by House and by Smuts to take this up in the Plenary Session. The Commission was moving swiftly now, and Articles from XVII to XXVII were adopted. All inquiries and suggestions of changes were put over to be ventilated in the Plenary. However, Article XXI was not presented. It provided for religious freedom and, paired with the Japanese proposal for racial equality, was omitted. Brazil, China, and Roumania expressed deep regret at the omission, and again the delegate of Portugal said that he feared his people would be reluctant to subscribe to a treaty on which the blessing of Deity had not been invoked. He could not recall a treaty to which his country had given its signature without mention of the name of Almighty God and the Blessed Trinity. . . .

No opportunity was given to refer to these omissions in the Plenary Session on the next afternoon at which President Wilson read his first draft of the Covenant. Those who wished to make suggestions and even changes were assured that ample opportunity would be given them later on. As a matter of fact, the world press gave an erroneous idea as to what happened on this occasion. It was announced that the draft had been adopted; such was not the case. Clemenceau announced from the chair after the report of President Wilson had been concluded:

“This report has been deposited with the Bureau of the Conference for examination and study by all the interested powers. The Bureau will lose no time in summoning the Conference as soon as it is in a position to bring up the report for discussion.”

Despite the charges that were made by many Senators in Washington, at this time no one was committed to acceptance of the Covenant, not even President AVilson, who inspired it. His work was now simply submitted to the world for study and prayerful examination.

In my judgment, at least, the determining factor in dropping the religious Article was the suggestion of Baron Makino that the Japanese proposal for a formal recognition of racial equality should be dovetailed into it. Makino maintained that questions of religion and of race could well go together. Makino accepted his defeat with characteristic dignity, merely reserving his right to bring up the matter at a later date.¹